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INTRODUCTION 
Legal scholarship, indeed the legal system itself, has often argued that the United States 
Supreme Court merely settles Constitutional principles in a contemporary context.  It is a system 
that argues objectivity and places heavy emphasis on its past decisions in deciding new cases.  
Yet occasionally, the courts have reversed what had been settled law for many decades. One such 
instance was Brown v. Board of Education, the 1954 landmark school desegregation case, when 
the Court unanimously invalidated the application of Plessy v. Ferguson.1  Under the holding of 
Plessy, separate public school facilities were considered constitutional as long as they were 
equal.2  Brown generated a great deal of controversy and resistance among Southern whites, 
leading to much discussion (popular, political, and scholarly) of the school segregation decisions 
of the lower federal courts, the institutions subsequently charged with enforcing Brown.  Most 
common is a narrative of increasing racial egalitarianism, echoed by the Court most notably in its 
                                                          
* Erica Frankenberg (Ed.D., Harvard University) is an assistant professor in the Department of Education Policy Studies 
in the College of Education at the Pennsylvania State University. The author wishes to thank Preston Green and Leah 
Aden for helpful comments on this draft and Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham for comments on an earlier draft. Thanks also 
to Tiffanie Lewis for her help. 
1 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 (1954). 
2 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011
FRANKENBERG-FORMATTED[1].DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/5/2011  6:35 PM 
68 UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE [Vol. 15 
Loving decision overturning a Virginia law banning interracial marriage.3  “We have consistently 
denied the constitutionality of measures which restrict the rights of citizens on the account of 
race,” the Court held just thirteen years after Brown.4 
Although school desegregation decisions concern the racial ideologies and classifications 
that govern society, legal scholarship rarely focuses on how contemporary understandings about 
race affected these decisions.5  This is particularly important at the district court level where much 
of the social science evidence about the effects of racial discrimination is presented.  I argue that, 
in examining the four district court opinions that were eventually consolidated into Brown upon 
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the influence of new understandings about race on the district 
court judges was limited.  Only one judge, Waties Waring in South Carolina, questioned not only 
the role that race and racism played in creating a segregated society, but also the very notion of 
race, in deciding that segregated schools were unconstitutional.  Although the plaintiffs in all four 
cases were represented by NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) lawyers who included social 
science evidence questioning the “separate but equal” premise of Plessy in their constitutional 
arguments, the degree to which social science infused the judge’s opinions ’varied widely from 
case to case. 
In Part I, before analyzing the district court opinions, I review law journals’ treatment of 
race in the years preceding the lower courts’ decisions.  I next examine the decisions in the four 
cases: Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, Virginia, in Part II; Brown v. 
Board of Education of Topeka, in Part III; Gebhart v. Belton, from New Castle County Delaware, 
in Part IV; and Briggs v. Elliott, on appeal from Clarendon County, South Carolina in Part V.  
Part VI examines the lone dissent in the four cases of Judge Waties Waring in the Clarendon 
County, South Carolina case. The Article concludes in Part VII. 
Our society continues to grapple with racial inequality and segregation in the nation’s 
public schools, and indeed may be undoing much of the progress that came after the Brown 
decision.6  In addition to judicial questions about the contemporary nature of race and racial 
classification,7 as was the case in many of the district court opinions preceding Brown, social 
science still only has limited influence in informing school segregation decisions.8 
                                                          
3 See generally Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
4 Id. at 11–12. 
5 See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).  This case is the 
latest in a long line of cases that demonstrates hostility towards any governmental decision-making that uses racial 
classifications.  For example, Chief Justice Roberts quoted Adarand, writing “[D]istinctions between citizens solely 
because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine 
of equality” Id. at 745–46 (internal quotations omitted).  Justice Kennedy’s controlling opinion does question the racial 
classifications the school districts employed—suggesting that “white” and “non-white” were “crude racial categories.” Id. 
at 786.  Neither of these statements, however, question the fundamental concept of race despite more recent social science 
acceptance that race is socially constructed.  See generally Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some 
Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994) (arguing that objective 
categories of race, such as Caucasoid, Negroid, and Mongoloid, are an illusion, but that social constructions of race are 
very real). 
6 GARY ORFIELD, UCLA CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, REVIVING THE GOAL OF AN INTEGRATED SOCIETY: A 21ST 
CENTURY CHALLENGE 3 (2009) (reporting that fifty-five years after the Brown decision, schools in the United States are 
more segregated than ever); see also Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 803. 
7 Adam Liptak, Sotomayor Reflects on First Years on Court, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2011, at A17 (expressing 
Justice Sotomayor’s skepticism at Chief Justice Roberts “simple” view of race and colorblindness). 
8 See generally Erica Frankenberg & Liliana M. Garces, The Use of Social Science Evidence in Parents 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol15/iss1/4
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I. RACE IN CONTEMPORARY LAW JOURNALS 
Before turning to an examination of the district court decisions, I first review how legal 
journal articles wrote about race in the early 20th century.  These prominent journals are the most 
likely contemporary sources to have been read by judges and to have influenced their thinking.  
Law professor Herbert Hovenkamp argues that social science knowledge can affect judges in two 
ways: (1) by formally presenting generally agreed upon facts on point to the case at hand,9 and (2) 
by being part of the way judges understand or have internalized accepted facts and science.10  
Leading law journals in the decades prior to the school segregation cases discussed the growing 
importance of social science as a means of illuminating legal problems.  These articles made 
frequent references to social science’s understandings about race and the effect of racial 
discrimination in society.  Felix Frankfurter wrote one such article in the early 1930s.11  At the 
time of the article’s publication, Frankfurter was a professor at Harvard Law School.  He was 
subsequently appointed to the Supreme Court and was a Justice on the Court at the time of Brown.  
In this article, Frankfurter suggested that social science could give lawyers and judges new 
information and contextualize prior knowledge in a new perspective.12  In reviewing a newly 
published encyclopedia of social sciences, he specifically cited Franz Boas’ article on 
anthropology as perhaps being more helpful than a “technically legal article.”13  By 1911, Boas 
had begun to show that the physical traits of Negroes that differed from those of whites were not 
inheritable, but due to environmental causes, which attacked previously held notions of “scientific 
racism” that assumed physical characteristics differ predictably by race.14  A Yale Law Journal 
review of Boas’ 1928 Anthropology and Modern Life discussed at some length his argument for 
the complexity of humans and the likelihood that racial purity did not exist and lauded the 
application of anthropology to the study of contemporary problems.15  The work of Gunnar 
Myrdal, who differed from Boas in focusing on the role of race in American society as opposed to 
the concept of race itself, was also cited often in law reviews, particularly those articles directly 
questioning the constitutionality of segregation in education.16 
                                                          
Involved and Meredith: Implications for Researchers and Schools, 46 LOUISVILLE L. REV. 703 (2008) (analyzing the use 
and misuse of social science evidence in the five opinions in the Parents Involved decision). 
9 One such brief was filed with the Supreme Court by a handful of prominent social scientists when the 
Brown cases were heard by the Court. See Robert L. Carter et al., The Effects of Segregation and the Consequences of 
Desegregation: A Social Science Statement, J. OF NEGRO EDUC. 68 (1953). Most notably, psychological research about 
race by Kenneth Clark of the City College of New York was summarized in this brief and in the subsequent decision in 
Brown. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 n.11. 
10 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation before Brown, 1985 DUKE L.J. 624, 627 (1985).  
Hovenkamp reviewed the advances in social science knowledge about race from the first decade of the twentieth century 
and argued that the Supreme Court’s decisions for the fifty-year period after Plessy “closely tracked prevailing scientific 
opinion on race.” Id. at 664. 
11 Felix Frankfurter, Book Review, 44 HARV. L. REV. 137, 147–48 (1931). 
12 Id. at 148. 
13 Id. 
14 Franz Boas, The Instability of Human Types, in THE IDEA OF RACE 84, 84–88 (Robert Bernasconi & 
Tommy Lott eds., 2000). 
15 Donald Slesinger, Book Review, 38 YALE L. J. 690, 694–96 (1928–29). 
16 See, e.g., Note, Constitutionality of Educational Segregation, 17 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 208, 210 n.13 
(1949); Note, Segregation in Public Schools – A Violation of “Equal Protection of the Laws,” 56 YALE L. J. 1059, 1061 
(1947). 
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In these legal publications, there also was specific discussion of how the new social 
science knowledge of race invalidated Plessy.  For example, a Note in the Yale Law Journal, 
commenting on the Mendez v. Westminster case17 stated that “[m]odern sociological and 
psychological studies lend much support to the District Court’s views” that schools should be 
open to all children regardless of race or ethnicity.18  The author of the unsigned Note declared 
that “[e]very authority on psychology and sociology” agrees that segregation injured students and 
cited a variety of contemporary social science evidence to expand upon this point.19 
Contemporary law journals in the years preceding the consideration of the school 
segregation cases discussed ways in which new understanding about race might challenge legal 
precedent.  I next examine whether these scientific ideas influenced the four lower federal courts 
that considered challenges to segregated K-12 schools in the early 1950s. 
II. THE INFLUENCE OF PAST IDEAS AND CUSTOMS ABOUT RACE: PRINCE 
EDWARD COUNTY, VIRGINIA 
In a short, unanimous opinion, a three-judge court in Prince Edward County, Virginia 
rejected black plaintiffs’ arguments that segregation deprived them of their constitutional rights.20  
The court decided that they could not determine factually whether the plaintiffs’ evidence, offered 
by “[e]minent educators, anthropologies, psychologists and psychiatrists,” was more persuasive 
than the defendants’ “equally distinguished and qualified educationists and leaders in the other 
fields.”21  Instead, they held that there was ample legal precedent to determine the 
constitutionality of segregation in schools.22  Ironically, after stating that they could not 
distinguish which of the two parties presented stronger social science testimony, the opinion still 
relied more on outdated ideas and customs about race embedded in Virginia’s history to 
legitimize segregated schools than it did on legal precedent.23 
While the opinion discusses the history of segregation in Virginia, it contains little 
discussion of the concept of race or the role of racial discrimination in Virginian society.  In fact, 
the judges used the long history of racial separation in Virginia as further reason why the 
separation of white and black students was reasonable.24  The judges wrote, 
It indisputably appears from the evidence that the separation provision rests 
neither upon prejudice, nor caprice, nor upon any other measureless foundation.  
Rather the proof is that it declares one of the ways of life in Virginia.  
                                                          
17 Mendez v. Westminster Sch. Dist. of Orange Cnty., 161 F.2d 774, 777 (9th Cir. 1947) (questioning the 
validity of Plessy in a California district that segregated Mexican-American students). 
18 Note, Segregation in Public Schools, supra note 16, at 1060. 
19 Id. at 1061. 
20 Davis v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cnty., 103 F. Supp. 337, 337–38, 340–41 (E.D.Va. 1952). 
21 Id. at 338. 
22 Id. at 339. 
23 Id. 
24 See id. at 339–40. “Reasonable” was a term used by the Plessy majority.  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 
537, 550–51 (1896).  Part of the Justices’ rationale in Plessy was based on their belief that racial distinctions were 
reasonable and would invariably be made—even though they also reserved the right of each state to determine who was 
colored.  Thus, this “invariable” distinction, in reality, actually differed by state.  Id. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol15/iss1/4
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Separation of white and colored ‘children’ in the public schools of Virginia has 
for generations been a part of the mores of her people.25 
The court cited two arguments to support this declaration.  First, the judges recited the 
history of clauses in Virginia law providing for the provision of public education beginning in the 
years following the Civil War through 1950, but only if white and “colored” students were 
educated in separate schools.26  They attributed significance to these rules, noting that the school 
segregation clauses were “the only racial segregation direction contained in the constitution of 
Virginia.”27  Second, the judges argued that school segregation had “begotten greater 
opportunities for the Negro” while involuntarily eliminating segregated schools would harm 
public education and students of both races.28  The court supported this argument primarily by 
relying on the testimony of the president of the University of Virginia, because they “believe him 
[to be] delicately sensible of the customs, minds, and the temper of both races in Virginia.”29  The 
unnamed president offered a “candid and knowledgeable discussion of the problem,” namely that 
segregated schools were “[s]o ingrained and wrought in the texture of [the public’s] life” that to 
end this practice would diminish public interest in, and their financial support of, schools.30  His 
belief that support for school systems would wane if the practice of segregation were to be ended 
by the courts had particular resonance for the judges who pointed out that a considerable majority 
of the residents were white.  The court concluded that this was a “reasonable basis” to continue 
the practice of school segregation.31 
The decision did not cite any legal precedent or social science evidence in the section of 
the opinion explaining how segregation was a way of life in Virginia, which is indicative itself of 
implicit ideas about the role of race in their society.  Yet, the court found that school segregation 
had not hurt students of either race and was seemingly most concerned about the potential harm of 
ending the long-accepted custom of separating students by race.32  In so doing, the judges 
dismissed the question of whether segregated schools violated the Fourteenth Amendment.  Their 
opinion was similar to, and repeatedly cited, the Briggs opinion written a year earlier in South 
Carolina.33  The Briggs decision is discussed in Part V. 
III. BROWN V. BOARD, TOPEKA, KANSAS: FINDINGS OF FACT, FOLLOWING 
THE COURT 
Unlike the rigid Jim Crow laws of southern states, Kansas law only required school 
segregation at the elementary level, and then only in cities with a population greater than 
15,000.34  While the Kansas law gave the Topeka school board the opportunity to end school 
                                                          
25 Davis, 103 F.Supp. at 339. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 340. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Davis, 103 F.Supp. at 340. 
32 Id. 
33 See generally Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529 (1951). 
34 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 484 n.1 (1954). 
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segregation, the school board denied the NAACP’s request to do so.35  The Topeka case 
chronologically followed the South Carolina case (Briggs), which had been the NAACP LDF’s 
first use of social science to complement its legal arguments about the inherent inequality of 
segregation.36  The plaintiffs, led by Robert Carter, assembled a team of social scientists who 
testified not only about material differences between the educational environments for black and 
white children in Topeka, but whose testimony reinforced the conclusion that attending state-
sanctioned segregated schools harmed black children.37  This conclusion was essential to arguing 
that segregated schools violated the black students’ right to equal opportunity. 
In response to the plaintiffs’ contention that segregation violated their rights, the three-
judge panel in Kansas candidly admitted that this “poses a question not free from difficulty.”38  In 
an opinion written by Circuit Judge Walter A. Huxman, the judges went on to say by way of 
explanation that, as a lower court, they were bound by the Supreme Court if they had spoken on a 
given issue and could not “substitute [their] own views for the declared law.”39  Having found that 
Topeka’s white and colored schools were substantially equal, the judges relied primarily on the 
Plessy decision to justify that segregation was not unequal.40 In doing so, they explicitly refuted 
the plaintiffs’ argument that contemporary social science evidence necessitated re-examining 
Plessy.41  To support their reliance on legal precedent, the Kansas panel in Brown recounted 
several times that the Court in Sweatt and Gong Lum had not reviewed Plessy.42  Yet, they also 
had difficulty reconciling the Supreme Court’s treatment of segregation in McLaurin and Sweatt 
with Plessy.43  Specifically, in McLaurin and Sweatt, the Court held that segregation was 
unconstitutional in the context of higher education.44  Ultimately, the district court narrowly 
defined the questions considered in Sweatt and McLaurin as the application of the Equal 
                                                          
35 See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK 
AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 394 (1975). 
36 Id. at 400. 
37 See id. at 419–20. 
38 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 98 F. Supp. 797, 798 (D. Kan. 1951). 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 798–799. 
42 Id. at 799–800.  See also Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).  In Gong Lum v. Rice, a decision by the 
Supreme Court in 1927, the Justices determined that the state of Mississippi could classify Chinese students as “colored” 
for purposes of maintaining white and colored K-12 schools.  275 U.S. 78 (1927).  Justice Taft’s unanimous opinion cited 
Plessy in part to justify their holding.  Id.  Notably, even though the Brown decision went on to wrestle with whether the 
declaration that separate higher educational facilities were unequal in Sweatt should be applied in the present K-12 
context, the decision noted that, “in the late case of Sweatt v. Painter, the Supreme Court again refused to review the 
Plessy case” to demonstrate that Plessy’s holdings remained guiding precedent.  Brown, 98 F. Supp. at 799 (internal 
citations omitted). 
43 Brown, 98 F.Supp. at 799. See also McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ. 339 U.S. 637 
(1950). 
44 In Sweatt, the Supreme Court declared that the separate law school created by the University of Texas to 
educate black students (to avoid having to admit black students to its white-only law school) did not provide equal 
educational opportunity because segregation from white students limited the educational and future occupational prospects 
of students. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 633–35. Similarly, in McLaurin, the Court ruled that the plaintiff attending medical school 
was handicapped by the requirement that he sit in a separate, designated spot in the classroom, library, and cafeteria, 
which prohibited interaction with other students.  McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 639–41.  This, they reasoned, also provided 
unequal preparation for his future profession and was therefore unconstitutional.  Id. 
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Protection Clause to graduate education only.45  Social science evidence was presented by the 
plaintiff’s lawyers about the harms of racial segregation in higher education, but because the 
Kansas panel narrowly construed the focus of Sweatt and McLaurin to graduate education, could 
not consider this evidence as relevant.46  Huxman’s opinion raised a number of questions about 
the applicability of the Plessy decision to public education, but concluded that because Plessy and 
Gong Lum had not been overturned by the Court itself, a segregated but equal public school 
system like Topeka’s was constitutional.47 
In relying on Plessy as prevailing doctrine, the judges in the Kansas case quoted Sweatt: 
“nor need we reach petitioner’s contention that Plessy v. Ferguson should be reexamined in the 
light of contemporary knowledge respecting . . . the effects of racial segregation.”48  In doing so, 
their final judgment of law did not incorporate the substantial testimony of social science 
evidence that the LDF lawyers presented about the psychological effect of racial prejudice and 
segregation.  Perhaps as a compromise, the judges attached nine findings of fact to their decision, 
including a finding about the sense of inferiority that results from segregated schools.49  Jack 
Greenberg, one of the NAACP LDF lawyers in the Brown case, believed that two findings of this 
lower court panel were critical: 1) black and white schools in Topeka were substantially equal; 
and 2) no matter how equal the facilities were, segregation injured black children in these 
schools.50  This evidence, it would turn out, achieved prominence in the Supreme Court’s decision 
three years later, yet there was no mention of the findings of fact in the text of the decision itself.51  
Although the judges must have agreed with much of the social science evidence to reach these 
conclusions, their ideas about race and racism were not strong enough to override the importance 
of the legal precedent of Plessy. 
IV. CONSTRAINED BY PRECEDENT: FACT VS. LAW IN DELAWARE 
The lower court judge in Delaware, Chancellor Collins Seitz, considered both the social 
science evidence and legal precedent and came to two different conclusions about racial 
segregation in public schools.52  Seitz, a judge recently promoted from vice-chancellor to 
chancellor, began his opinion discussing the testimony of the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses in 
“education, sociology, psychology, psychiatry and anthropology” whose “qualifications were 
fully established.”53  He pointed out that there were “no witnesses in opposition.”54  Relying 
heavily on the testimony of one of “America’s foremost psychiatrists,” Seitz concluded that state-
                                                          
45 Brown, 98 F. Supp. at 799–800. 
46 Id.  According to Mark Tushnet, Thurgood Marshall thought social science evidence would be more 
necessary in the K-12 school context than in Sweatt, for example, since the Justices had an “intuitive” understanding of 
how segregated legal education might be harmful.  MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW, THURGOOD 
MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936–1961, at 156–57 (1994). 
47 Brown, 98 F. Supp. at 799–800. 
48 Id. at 798. 
49 KLUGER, supra note 35, at 424. 
50 JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURT: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 131 (1994). 
51 See Brown, 98 F. Supp at 797–800. 
52 See Belton v. Gebhart, 32 Del. Ch. 343 (1952). 
53 Id. at 348. 
54 Id. 
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imposed segregation might create feelings of inferiority in black students to the point that it might 
hinder their education as compared to white students.55 
Despite this finding of fact, little evidence exists in the opinion to suggest that Seitz was 
aware of, or influenced by, contemporary social sciences understanding of race. Seitz’s focus was 
on the effects of a segregated environment in creating a sense of inferiority, and he determined 
that segregation created a “mental health problem in many Negro children.”56  Decades earlier, 
anthropologist Franz Boas had discussed the effect of a segregated environment based on 
observations he had made, primarily focusing on how they caused changes in physical type.  He 
concluded, however, that “the mental make-up of a certain type of man may be considerably 
influenced by his social and geographical environment.”57  Boas’ observations of the environment 
challenged the notion of the stability of racial classification.  While this could have undermined 
prior precedent to the extent that it would not apply to the present case, it was not a question that 
Seitz raised in his opinion. 
After boldly declaring that segregation resulted in an inferior education, Seitz hastened to 
add that this fact did not answer the question of whether segregation violated the Constitution.58  
Instead, he believed that it was important to consider decisions of the Supreme Court that spoke to 
this issue.59  Although conceding, as plaintiffs had argued, that the Court had never considered a 
case regarding the effect of segregation on students, he believed it was fairer to consider a broader 
question about the general holdings of the Court with regard to the constitutionality of 
segregation.60  Framing the question in such a way led him to Plessy and Gong Lum, the latter 
case determining that a “colored” student’s segregated school was constitutional.61  Relying on 
these cases as the proper precedent, he believed that the Court had recognized separate could be 
equal in elementary and secondary education even though, “this could not be true were my 
finding of fact [that segregation creates feelings of inferiority in black students that hinders their 
education] given constitutional recognition.”62  Seitz concluded that “while [s]tate-imposed 
segregation in lower education provides Negroes with inferior educational opportunities, such 
inferiority has not yet been recognized by the United States Supreme Court as violating the 
Fourteenth Amendment. . . . It is for that Court to re-examine its doctrine in the light of my 
finding of fact.”63 
Once Seitz concluded that, according to legal precedent, segregation was not in violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, he then turned to the question of whether separate was equal in the 
New Castle County, Delaware schools.64  His lengthy analysis of this issue considered a variety of 
common measures—length of students’ journeys to school, the school’s facilities, the educational 
                                                          
55 See id. 
56 Id. 
57 Boas, supra note 14, at 88. 
58 Belton v. Gebhart, 87 A.2d 863, 865 (Del. Ch. 1952). 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 See Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927). In fact, in Gong Lum, the Court declared that the question of 
whether segregated schools were constitutional was easier than that of the segregated railroad cars under consideration in 
Plessy. Id. 
62 Belton, 87 A.2d at 865. 
63 Id. at 866. 
64 Id. at 868. 
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qualifications of faculty members, class size, and curricular and extracurricular activity 
offerings.65  In fact, he personally visited the specific white and black schools that were at issue.66  
Seitz brushed aside arguments by the defendants that in some aspects the Negro schools were 
superior.67  Rather, his comparison of schools led him to write, for example, “[i]f this be a harsh 
test, then I answer that a State which divides its citizens should pay the price.”68  Comparing the 
education offered to students in black schools with that offered to students in white schools, he 
concluded that the State had violated the rights of the plaintiffs by denying them admission to the 
white school.69  Despite the arguments of the defendants that equalization plans for the black 
schools were in progress, he ordered the immediate admission of plaintiffs and other similarly 
situated students to the white schools.70  Further, he placed the burden on the school board at 
some later date when students were offered an equal education to prove that such access was 
unnecessary.71 
Although Seitz explicitly recognized the value of new social science evidence in 
concluding on the harmful impact of state-imposed segregation, he evidently did not believe that 
the evidence was strong enough to render past legal decisions irrelevant.72  In a conflict of judicial 
precedent and current “facts,” the former proved a stronger influence in Seitz’s decision, a 
conclusion that was upheld by a three-judge Delaware Supreme Court panel that reviewed his 
decision.73  The panel did not review the Chancellor’s finding that segregation harmed students 
because they concluded that he was correct in determining that this finding did not affect the 
determination of whether segregation was in violation of the Constitution.  Nor did they argue 
with his finding of inferior educational opportunities, and instead agreed that the Supreme Court 
should be the court to say that segregation is unconstitutional.74 
In fact, the three-judge panel upholding Seitz’s lower court decision was similarly 
unaffected by contemporary understanding of race.  Although there is no explicit consideration of 
race or racial understanding in the decision, in the beginning of his Delaware Supreme Court 
opinion, Chief Justice Southerland referred to plaintiffs as “citizens of Negro blood.”75  This 
description echoed a nineteenth century understanding of race as being biologically determined, a 
view that by the 1950s was discredited.  The Plessy decision also used blood as a way of defining 
race, referring to the “colored blood” of plaintiff Homer Plessy who appeared white but was one-
eighth black (and therefore considered black according to the one-drop rule).76 
In a decision affirmed by the higher court, Seitz ultimately believed that legal precedent 
prevented him from ruling that segregated schools, in principle, were unconstitutional despite his 
factual finding that segregated schools created inferior educational opportunities for black 
                                                          
65 Id. at 866–71. 
66 Id. at 866. 
67 Id. at 867. 
68 Id. at 868. 
69 Id. at 871. 
70 Belton, 87 A.2d at 871. 
71 Id. at 870. 
72 Id. at 865. 
73 Gebhart v. Belton, 91 A.2d 137, 142 (Del. 1952). 
74 Id. 
75 Gebhart v. Belton, 91 A.2d 137, 139 (Del. 1952). 
76 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 541 (1896). 
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students.  Yet, plaintiffs in the Delaware case were the only plaintiffs in the four cases to be 
granted admission to white schools as relief to their claims on the second issue in their case, 
specifically the equality of the segregated schools in question. 
V. THE BRIGGS’ MAJORITY FOCUS ON PRECEDENT 
Briggs v. Elliott, in South Carolina, was the only decision with a dissent, although the 
majority affirmed the legality of South Carolina’s segregation practices.  The majority opinion in 
Briggs, written by Fourth Circuit Judge John Parker77 and joined by District Judge George 
Timmerman,78 contained no explicit discussion of race.  Parker’s opinion repeatedly emphasized 
the importance of constitutional precedent and the legislative branch in determining whether 
segregation was wise policy. In fact, it even suggested that if the court abolished segregation 
where equal schools existed, it would threaten the very existence of the constitutional system.79 
For Parker and Timmerman, social science theories about the role of race in classifying 
and segregating students, as well as the harms that result from such actions, were not strong 
enough to overturn a large body of law permitting segregated schooling that they saw as 
“reasonable.”80  In addition, their majority opinion downplayed the significance of social science 
theories influencing judicial ideas about race.  In contrast to Chancellor Seitz who wrestled with 
the conflict of legal precedent and what he believed to be contradictory findings of fact, Judge 
Parker’s opinion was dismissive of theories of educators and sociologists, which he believed had 
little bearing on constitutional law.81  The opinion noted that segregation was not in violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, asserting, “we think that this conclusion is supported by 
overwhelming authority which we are not at liberty to disregard on the basis of theories advanced 
by a few educators and sociologists.”82 
                                                          
77 Judge Parker was the chief judge of the Fourth Circuit, and, according to Jack Greenberg, was liked by 
Thurgood Marshall.  See GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURT, supra note 50, at 121.  The NAACP had achieved 
several early civil rights victories in Judge Parker’s courtroom, including affirming Judge Waring’s lower court decision 
invalidating the white primary in North Carolina.  See KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 35, at 303. 
78 Judge Waring described Judge Timmerman, the third member of this three-judge panel, as an avowed 
segregationist, while Kluger described him as an “out-spoken advocate of white supremacy.” See JULIUS WATIES 
WARING, ORAL HISTORY PROJECT AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, REMINISCENCES OF JULIUS WATIES WARING 358 (1957); 
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 35, at 303. 
79 See Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529, 537 (D.S.C. 1951). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 536. 
82 Id. at 537.  The NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) presented social science experts from a number of 
prominent universities in the Briggs case including Horace McNally, a professor at Teachers College, Columbia 
University, who argued that separating students implied stigma; Ellis Knox, education professor at Howard University, 
who stated that segregation cannot exist without disadvantage to the minority group; Kenneth Clark, professor of 
psychology at City College, presented his findings of black inferiority due to segregated schools based on his doll studies; 
and Louis Kesselman, professor of political science at University of Louisville, who said segregation prevented students 
from understanding the needs and interests of both groups.  See GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURT, supra note 50, at 
123.  Additionally, the LDF lawyers read into the record, from the Sweatt case, testimony of Robert Redfield, a law 
professor at University of Chicago in which he discussed evidence that there had not been differences between Negroes 
and whites in intellectual capacity or inability to learn.  Id. at 125.  According to Judge Waring’s dissent, other social 
science experts were unable to make it to South Carolina due to maneuvers by the school board.  Briggs, 98 F. Supp. at 
540.  Because of the school district’s surprising admission that their schools were not equal, a remarkably short defense, 
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The two judges bolstered their opinion by relying on the traditional belief in the 
supremacy of law, which governed legal thinking and placed heavy emphasis on preexisting 
law.83  If followed to its fullest extent, this prevented new ideas about race from affecting judicial 
decisions.  The majority opinion cited and quoted extensively from Plessy and Gong Lum as 
precedent for the constitutionality of segregating black and white children despite the Supreme 
Court’s more recent higher education decisions of McLaurin and Sweatt.84  They also took 
considerable pains to point out the many areas—including states outside the South—where 
segregated schools prevailed.85  Finally, to vindicate their position, they cited a decision from the 
District of Columbia in the previous year that called attention to the difficulties that occur when 
people of more than one race coexist in the same area, a problem that was insoluble by force, 
according to the opinion.86 
Similar to the Virginia opinion the following year, Parker and Timmerman neglected to 
examine the racial customs of South Carolina and how those customs affected their ruling.  They 
wrote, “[t]he classification of children for the purpose of education in separate schools has a basis 
grounded in reason and experience; and, if equal facilities are afforded, it cannot be condemned as 
discriminatory. . . .”87  This statement is indicative of a belief in the validity of racial 
classifications that had long been the custom in South Carolina society; yet it was a belief that 
was extensively questioned by social scientists at the time. 
VI. THE LONE DISSENTER 
The dissenting judge in the Briggs case, and, in fact, the only dissenting judge among the 
more than a dozen lower court judges to hear the original four cases that were consolidated in 
1952 before the Supreme Court as Brown v. Board of Education was J. Waties Waring, a district 
court judge in the Eastern District of South Carolina.  Waring wrote a vigorous dissent as a 
member of the three-judge panel hearing Briggs v. Elliot.  Although he later commented that he 
viewed Chief Justice Earl Warren’s Brown decision as much more eloquent than his,88 Waring’s 
dissent goes into greater discussion of race than Warren’s or any other judge involved in the 
school segregation decisions.  In ultimately declaring that segregation violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Waring not only lamented the effect of the practice of racial discrimination (in the 
form of state-imposed school segregation) on black children, but he also challenged the very 
notion of race as a concept.89  To some extent, his dissent both addressed the opinion of the 
Briggs majority, and dialogued with the Plessy majority of over fifty years earlier. 
                                                          
and the impatience of Judge Parker to wait for more social science testimony, the other LDF experts did not make it to 
South Carolina prior to closing arguments. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 35, at 358–63. 
83 Briggs, 98 F. Supp. at 537. 
84 Id. at 532–35. 
85 Id. at 537. 
86 See Carr v. Corning, 182 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1950). 
87 Briggs, 98 F. Supp. at 536. 
88 See WARING, ORAL HISTORY, supra note 78, at 365. 
89 Briggs, 98 F. Supp. at 542. 
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A. Questioning “Race” 
Waring began his dissent by praising the plaintiffs for bringing the Briggs case, noting 
that it “must have cost much in effort and financial expenditures” despite the “long established 
and age-old pattern of the way of life” that had existed in South Carolina “since and as a result of 
the institution of human slavery.”90  While the Briggs majority relied upon this “way of life” as 
rationale for their holding, Waring criticized the defendants and the court for using this as an 
excuse for avoiding the question of whether “segregation in education in our schools is legal” and 
whether this was permitted under the guarantees of the U.S. Constitution.91 
Important to Waring’s reasoning about the nature of school segregation was the 
country’s history of inequitable treatment on the basis of race.  In instituting human slavery in the 
United States, Waring noted “[s]lavery was nothing new in the world.”92  Discussing various 
forms of slavery, he suggested that it “perhaps reached its worst form in Nazi Germany.”93  
Waring contextualized the adoption of the 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments as a way of eradicating 
slavery and part of the world’s “great awakening” that began with philosophers and religious 
leaders.94  Indeed, he portrayed their adoption as practically inevitable in order for the country to 
endorse the principles of the Declaration of Independence.95  Thus, he found it “unnecessary” to 
sort through “voluminous arguments and opinions” to ascertain what the Fourteenth Amendment 
meant.96  He believed that anyone “of ordinary ability and understanding of the English language” 
would know that it was intended to eliminate “all idea of discrimination and difference between 
American citizens.”97  This contrasted directly with the majority’s opinion in Plessy, which 
remarked that racial distinctions would invariably be made.98 
In considering whether South Carolina’s laws conflicted with the “true meaning” of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Waring further challenged previous judicial discussions of race by 
charging that they had “been intermingled with sophistry and prejudice.”99  By 1951, Justice 
Harlan’s Plessy dissent was one of the few judicial opinions in opposition to segregation.  
Although it was a decision about transportation and not about public schools, Plessy was 
subsequently cited as precedent to justify school segregation.  Even Harlan’s dissent had not 
questioned the validity of racial classification and, in fact, had acknowledged a racial hierarchy.100 
                                                          
90 Id. at 540. Waring’s opening narrative omits the beginning of this historic case.  Waring later commented 
that Marshall would not have challenged the constitutionality of segregated schools had Waring not forced him to 
withdraw his earlier case that simply challenged the equality of schools in Clarendon County, South Carolina. See 
WARING, supra note 78, at 344–345.  Greenberg suggested that Waring, having grown estranged from Charleston society, 
wanted to confront segregation directly and thus urged Marshall to re-file his case to do so.  See GREENBERG, CRUSADERS 
IN THE COURT, supra note 50, at 122; TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW, supra note 46, at 157–58. 
91 Briggs, 98 F. Supp. at 541. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 541–42. 
98 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896). 
99 Briggs, 98 F. Supp. at 542. 
100 Harlan’s dissent has long been held up even by LDF lawyers, who argued the segregation cases that 
culminated in Brown, as a ringing endorsement of the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, but a closer reading shows 
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Waring, however, questioned the arbitrary nature of defining races, echoing the arguments of 
Albion Tourgee who represented Homer Plessy over fifty years earlier.101  Waring asked, “What 
possible definition can be found for the so-called white race, Negro race or other races? Who is to 
decide and what is the test?”102  Highlighting the arbitrary nature of racial classification, Tourgee 
had suggested if “separate but equal” was adopted for separating two races, then such laws could 
also exist separating those whose hair was different colors or who were different nationalities.103 
Social scientists for several decades prior to Brown had questioned conceptions of race.  
Ashley Montagu, for example, proposed in the early 1940s that the concept of race is “utterly 
erroneous and meaningless” and “has done an infinite amount of harm and no good at all.”104  
Reference to blood was a common response in defining the race of a person in the nineteenth 
century and also in legal decisions; the majority opinion in Plessy, for example, described the 
petitioner as a mixture of Caucasian and African blood.105  Despite the fact that “the mixture of 
colored blood was not discernible in him,” he was considered colored under Louisiana’s statute.106  
Even as late as 1952, the Delaware Supreme Court that reviewed Seitz’s decision referred to the 
plaintiffs as being of Negro blood.107  Not unaware of this history, Waring directly challenged this 
perception of race, and in doing so, the entire system of separating students according to race.  He 
wrote, “[s]cience tells us that there are but four kinds of blood: A, B, AB and O, and these are 
found in Europens [sic], Asiatics, Africans, Americans and others.”108  Dismissively, he 
continued, “we need not further consider the irresponsible and baseless references to preservation 
of ‘Caucasian blood.’”109 
                                                          
a similar conception of race to that of the Plessy majority and a belief in white supremacy.  See TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, 
JUDICIAL ENIGMA: THE FIRST JUSTICE HARLAN 227–29 (1995).  Where Harlan differs from the majority, causing him to 
dissent, is that he believed that the country’s laws protected the civil rights of all men. Id.  In other words, he believed in 
legal equality but not social equality between whites and blacks. Id. He had explained these views earlier when running for 
governor of Kentucky in 1871, twenty-five years earlier.  Harlan advocated full legal equality between the races despite 
saying that he believed social equality could never exist in Kentucky and that it was proper to segregate Negro and white 
students in school.  Alan F. Westin, John Marshall Harlan and the Constitutional Rights of Negroes: The Transformation 
of a Southerner, 66 YALE L.J. 637, 662–63 (1957). 
101 Briggs, 98 F. Supp. at 542. 
102 Id. 
103 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 549.  Harlan briefly echoes Tourgee’s questioning of the arbitrary nature of laws 
regulating behavior on the basis of race, asking “why may not the state require the separation in railroad coaches of native 
and naturalized citizens of the United States, or of Protestants and Roman Catholics?”  Id. at 558. 
104 Ashley Montagu, The Concept of Race in the Human Species in the Light of Genetics, in THE IDEA OF 
RACE 100, 101 (Robert Bernasconi & Tommy Lott eds., 2000). 
105 Likewise, the Court’s 1927 Gong Lum decision, which confirmed the applicability of Plessy to public 
education, referred to blood to determine that the plaintiff, a Chinese student, was “colored.”  Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 
78, 78 (1927). 
106 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 538. 
107 Gebhart v. Belton, 91 A.2d 137, 139 (1952). 
108 Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529, 542 (D.S.C. 1951). 
109 Id.  Defenders of school segregation often raised the specter of intermarriage as a further reason schools 
should remain segregated.  For example, white Southern attorney generals filed an amicus brief in Sweatt saying that they 
did not want “their women in intimate social contact with Negro men.”  PETER IRONS & STEPHANIE GUITTON, MAY IT 
PLEASE THE COURT: THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ORAL ARGUMENTS SINCE 1955, at 376 (Peter Irons & Stephanie Guitton 
eds., 1993).  There are more recent examples of this biological basis of race persisting in judicial thought.  For example, 
during oral arguments of a case about racial preferences in government contracting, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that a 
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Attacking the notion of race further, Waring specifically questioned the proportions 
South Carolina had delineated as determining one’s race, namely that someone who was one-
eighth or more of African ancestry was considered to be a “Negro”.110  He questioned this 
proportion and whether it was based on any “reason” (a term frequently used in the majority’s 
decision in Briggs as well as Plessy).111  He further questioned how those assigning children 
would even be able to tell who was white and who was Negro.112  Carrying the law’s logic to its 
fullest extent, he rhetorically asked why the state should not establish a series of schools so that 
students of each percentage of African and Caucasian blood would not have to mix with students 
of different combinations.113  He answered himself, “the whole thing is unreasonable, unscientific, 
and based upon unadulterated prejudice.”114  This was in direct contradiction of the majority’s 
opinion that classifying and segregating students in schools was “grounded in reason and 
experience.”115 
Before Waring even discussed legal precedent—and perhaps in response to the 
majority’s criticism of social science theories, he had not cited any social science references to 
support his argument—he indicated his belief in the absurdity of race as a concept and as a means 
of classification.116  Mentioning that scientific understanding undermined the legal understanding 
of “blood” as a means of separating races, Waring challenged the very basis of Plessy and 
subsequent decisions that the other judges, including the other members of the Briggs panel, 
upheld as precedent.117 
B. The Practice of Racial Discrimination 
Walter Jackson argued that Swedish sociologist Gunnar Myrdal’s An American Dilemma 
had a strong effect on both intellectuals and policymakers from the 1940s to 1960s in 
“establishing a liberal orthodoxy around the ideas of integration,” but Jackson ultimately found 
that this was a somewhat limiting view in the realm of school segregation because, by focusing on 
prejudice as the source on inequality, it ignored the structural sources of racism.118  Further, by 
emphasizing the harm of segregation to African American students, Myrdal’s work also neglected 
a careful discussion of structures of African American resistance.119 
An avowed reader of Myrdal’s An American Dilemma, perhaps it is not surprising that 
Waring was also sensitive to the role of prejudice in affecting children in segregated schools.  
                                                          
policy giving racial and gender preferences was only about “blood . . . blood, not background and environment.” Neil 
Gotanda, A Critique of our Constitution is Color-Blind, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE 
MOVEMENT 257, 261 (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995). 
110 Briggs, 98 F. Supp. at 542. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 536. 
116 Id. at 542. 
117 Id. 
118 WALTER A. JACKSON, GUNNAR MYRDAL AND AMERICA’S CONSCIENCE: SOCIAL ENGINEERING AND 
RACIAL LIBERALISM, 1938-1987, at xviii (1990). 
119 Id. at xix. 
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After his challenge of the nature of defining racial groups, Waring discussed studies and 
testimony of the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses that demonstrated the harmful effect of segregation 
on children.120  Saying there was “absolutely no reasonable explanation for racial prejudice,” he 
disagreed with the majority’s determination that such classifications that resulted from this 
prejudice were reasonable.121  Moreover, Waring saw racial prejudice as acquired, not natural or 
inherited.122  Segregation, particularly in younger children, aided the acquisition of prejudice, 
which was later difficult to change.123  Waring implicitly drew upon social science evidence from 
Boas to Myrdal to emphasize the harmful nature of the practice of racial discrimination. 
Interestingly, Waring suggested a rationale for prior judicial decisions regarding 
segregation as he sought to buttress his dissent with legal precedent.  Noting that the Plessy 
decision came at a time when blacks were either former slaves themselves or children of former 
slaves, he suggested that this was why blacks were viewed as inferior by the Justices.124  Waring 
cited law in a variety of different twentieth-century contexts that had removed racial 
classification.125  Waring’s conception of what could be called racial liberalism in the judicial 
system in 1951—noting that the Plessy majority relied on pre-Civil War precedent126—was 
perhaps overstated in trying to support his opinion.127  Waring, however, argued that Briggs was 
not a case about railroad accommodations, and that too much time had already been wasted in 
trying to make such comparisons.128  Instead, he focused on the Court’s recent decisions in Sweatt 
and McLaurin to argue that the Court’s trend had been to declare that segregation in education 
was illegal.129  Waring’s reliance on the higher education cases contrasted with the Briggs 
majority, who painstakingly delineated the facts in the current case from the facts of the higher 
education cases as their reasoning for why Plessy, but not Sweatt and McLaurin, applied to public 
school segregation.130 
C. Influences on Waring’s Thinking 
What caused this one judge, a native in one of the Deep South states, to question what 
were commonly accepted ideas about race in judicial history and his own upper-class Charleston 
society?   
                                                          
120 Briggs, 98 F. Supp. at 547. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 547. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 544. 
125 Briggs, 98 F. Supp. at 543–44. In fact, citations to these cases were some of the only footnotes in Judge 
Waring’s entire dissent, and none were to any books, articles, or other social science evidence.  For example, he cited 
cases about peonage, transportation, criminals, housing, labor, suffrage, and higher education. Id. 
126 Id. at 544. 
127 Lani Guinier defines racial liberalism as “reject[ing] scientific racism and discredit[ing] its postulate of 
inherent black inferiority.” Lani Guinier, From Racial Liberalism to Racial Literacy: Brown v. Board of Education and 
the Interest-Divergence Dilemma, 91 J. OF AM. HIST. 92, 100 (2004). 
128 Briggs, 98 F. Supp. at 544–45. 
129 See KLUGER, supra note 35 at 266–67. 
130 Briggs, 98 F. Supp. at 545. 
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1. Contemporary Social Science Understanding of “Race” 
Waring had decided several cases regarding race before the Briggs case, which he later 
said: 
[made him] begin to think an awful lot because every time you looked into one 
of these things, the less reason you can see for resistance to what we commonly 
call the American creed of equality of all citizens of this country . . . you saw 
the old sophistry of trying to keep within the law, but declaring two classes of 
citizens, and that Negroes or people of partial Negro descent were not treated as 
ordinary American human beings, but were put in a separate classification . . . 
.131 
Waring further talked about the influence of reading Myrdal’s An American Dilemma (echoing, as 
quoted above, Myrdal’s notion of an American Creed) and Cash’s The Mind of the South.132  
These books helped Waring to understand the complexity of racial matters.  His solution to 
dealing with this complexity was simply to reject distinctions made on the basis of race. 
Speaking in the mid 1950s, Waring further discussed the racial ideas that influenced his 
thinking in deciding the Briggs case, commenting on Kenneth Clark’s testimony that segregation 
had “this deleterious effect [that] not only applied to Negro children, that it gave them the 
inferiority feeling . . . but that it had an equally bad effect on white children, because it gave them 
the idea that they were a race apart and separate.”133  He lamented that racial segregation created 
the idea of separate races in the minds of white and black students, which he saw as a false idea.  
But what seemed central to his skepticism of the Plessy doctrine were questions about the very 
meaning of race.  He mused: 
[I]f the people of the United States want to say that only people who come from 
the so-called Caucasian race can vote . . . . I won’t like it and I don’t know how 
they can enforce it, because I don’t know what the Caucasian race is and I don’t 
think anybody else knows.  It’s an entirely false idea that was based on the fact 
that a fellow . . . discovered a skull in the Caucasus that he thought was the 
finest type of human race, and he called it the Caucasian race.  Webster 
[dictionary], I believe, describes the Anglo-Saxon race as a mixed race.  I think 
all races are mixed races.134 
                                                          
131 WARING, supra note 78, at 235–36. 
132 Contemporary reviews of Cash’s The Mind of the South were somewhat positive.  A reviewer in The 
Journal of Negro History commented on Cash’s “incomplete emancipation” from Southern society, but hailed it as a 
“courageous and daring statement of the truth” of the “tardiness of [the South’s] progress.”  W.M. Brewer, 26 J. OF NEGRO 
HIST. 253, 253–55 (1941) (reviewing W.J. CASH, THE MIND OF THE SOUTH (1941)).  See also C. Vann Woodward, 7 J. S. 
HIST. 400, 400–01 (1941) (reviewing W.J. CASH., THE MIND OF THE SOUTH (1941)).  More recently, however, critics have 
found much to condemn in Cash’s book, including his blindness as a white Southern man to issues of power and sexuality. 
See NELL IRVIN PAINTER, SOUTHERN HISTORY ACROSS THE COLOR LINE 178–98 (2002). 
133 WARING, supra note 78, at 354. 
134 WARING, supra note 78, at 269–70. 
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Given such feelings about the idea of “race,”135 it is not surprising that Waring was opposed to 
accepting the constitutionality of schools that segregated students based on a concept whose 
validity he doubted existed and the application of which he viewed as being detrimental to the 
opportunities of black students. 
2.  Race and Awareness of Larger Context 
A widely accepted view among historians today is the importance of Cold War ideology 
in forcing the U.S. government to deal domestically with racial inequality.  In its briefs to the 
Court in the Brown case, the Justice Department relied heavily on national security issues, 
arguing that school segregation was unconstitutional and “presents an unsolved problem for 
American democracy, an inescapable challenge to the sincerity of our espousal of the democratic 
faith.”136  The Justice Department argued that the existence of racial discrimination against 
African Americans had harmed the country’s relationships with other countries and perception by 
the foreign press, the United Nations, and was part of the Soviet Union’s propaganda against the 
U.S.  The brief closed with an emphasis on the potential impact of an anti-segregation statement 
by the Court on international perceptions of the United States.137  Legal historian Mary Dudziak 
argues that the federal government’s response to civil rights was one that was constantly governed 
by attempts to promote the ideals of democracy abroad, and that during the early years of the Cold 
War, civil rights reforms were critical to the government’s narrative of race and democracy.138  
Dudziak’s analysis provides another example as to how the global context offered African 
Americans an opportunity to gain leverage with white Americans that was often difficult to 
achieve in the United States.139 
In his dissent, Waring expressed his disappointment at the opinion of his fellow district 
court judges in South Carolina.140  This was not the first time; in an earlier civil rights case 
regarding the constitutionality of an all-white primary, he had called on South Carolina to finally 
rejoin the Union.141  In Briggs, he wrote soberly that he thought the issue of school segregation 
was: 
[C]lear and important, particularly at this time when our national leaders are 
called upon to show to the world that our democracy means what it says and 
                                                          
135 These comments were made in the mid 1950s, several years after his decision and after the unanimous 
Brown decision.  These decisions along with the passage of time may have made him only more adamant in his rejection 
of race as a means for separating and segregating students. 
136 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) 
(No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5), 1952 WL 82045 at *31. 
137 Mary L. Dudziak, Brown as a Cold War Case, 91 J. AM. HIST. 32, 34 (2004). 
138 See generally MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY (2000) (arguing that the Cold War helped advance a civil rights agenda, as American leaders didn’t want 
American Racism to tarnish its international image). 
139 During earlier eras, other prominent African Americans including Frederick Douglass and Ida B. Wells 
have effectively appealed to foreigners when they lacked the ability to improve racial equality domestically. 
140 Briggs, 98 F. Supp. at 548. 
141 See Elmore v. Rice, 72 F. Supp. 516, 526–27 (1947). 
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that it is a true democracy and there is no under-cover suppression of the rights 
of any of our citizens because of the pigmentation of their skins.142 
In describing the U.S.’s history of slavery on the basis of racial distinctions, Waring 
linked this practice to the recent atrocities in Nazi Germany due to notions of racial superiority.143  
Although he did not explicitly cite him, the influence of Myrdal’s writing is apparent as Waring 
expressed dismay at the practice of racial discrimination, and its conflict with his interpretation of 
the Constitution and the American creed. 
Writing over a half-century before Waring, Justice Harlan expressed a similar concern 
for how the Plessy majority’s decision contradicted the United States’ position relative to the rest 
of the world.  He wrote, 
We boast of the freedom enjoyed by our people above all other peoples.  But it 
is difficult to reconcile that boast with a state of the law which, practically, puts 
the brand of servitude and degradation upon a large class of our fellow-citizens, 
our equals before the law.  The thin disguise of “equal” accommodations for 
passengers in railroad coaches will not mislead any one, nor atone for the wrong 
this day done.144 
Even at the close of the nineteenth century, Justice Harlan was uncomfortable enough with the 
contradictions between America’s proclamation of freedom to other nations and their treatment of 
some citizens because of ideas about race and racial discrimination.  It is interesting that the two 
judges to question the prevailing judicial ideas of race in Plessy and Briggs—albeit to a differing 
extent and at times when scientific notions about the concept of “race” were quite different—both 
noted the discrepancy between the majority opinion’s treatment of race and the contemporary 
ideals of the country as they would be viewed in a global context. 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
There was a variation in the extent that new social science understandings about race and 
racial classification informed the rulings of the lower court judges in the early 1950s as they 
considered four challenges to segregated schools brought by the NAACP LDF.  District court 
judges are expected to base their decisions on prior decisions by higher courts on related issues, as 
well as the facts of the case as presented in their courtrooms.  With the exception of Judge 
Waring, the other judges who heard school segregation cases prior to the Supreme Court in 1952 
all voted to affirm the Plessy precedent that separate could be equal.  The majority opinions in the 
South Carolina and Virginia cases, the two cases in the South, were the least receptive to 
incorporating contemporary scientific ideas about race that challenged legal precedent or, perhaps 
more significantly, deeply ingrained customs in their society.  The opinions from outside the 
South—Delaware and Kansas, former slave states but not part of the Confederacy—were more 
sympathetic to the social science evidence presented.  However, despite findings of fact in both 
opinions that segregation harmed children in segregated schools, the judges still felt bound by 
legal precedent to rule that segregated schools did not violate the Constitution.  Ironically, despite 
                                                          
142 Briggs, 98 F. Supp. at 548. 
143 Id. at 541. 
144 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 562 (1896). 
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the fact that these decisions affirmed Plessy, they ultimately had more of an immediate impact on 
ending segregation than Waring’s dissent.  In Delaware, black students were admitted to white 
schools deemed to be superior to existing black schools, and the findings of fact in the Kansas 
case were incorporated into the Supreme Court’s Brown decision. 
Yet, Waring, a native of Charleston and a member of its elite society, presented with the 
same social science evidence and arguments about appropriate legal precedents, not only agreed 
with the plaintiffs about the harmful practice of racial discrimination in segregating students, but 
questioned the entire basis of racial classification: the concept of race itself.  Almost in dialogue 
with the Plessy majority, in addition to the majority in the Briggs case, Waring parsed the racial 
arguments that had long been used to justify legal separation and demonstrated a keen awareness 
of the ideas about race and racial discrimination from social science knowledge, which had been 
questioning traditional understandings of inferior and superior races. 
To some extent, Waring’s opinion was more radical in its conception of race than even 
the monumental Brown decision by a unanimous Supreme Court three years later.  By the time 
Brown was decided, Waring had left the bench and South Carolina, believing that his Briggs 
opinion had ended his usefulness as a judge there.145  The Brown decision was sweeping in 
declaring that in the field of public education, segregation was inherently unequal, but the opinion 
contained no discussion of race itself and made no mention of Waring’s dissent.146 
Towards the end of the fairly short opinion in Brown, Chief Justice Earl Warren 
incorporated one of the factual findings that the Kansas judges had appended to their decision: the 
finding that segregated schools had a detrimental effect on black children.147  This mention 
preceded a short yet heavily contested statement that this finding of inferiority was supported by 
modern social science, including a footnote to a series of social science works, most concerning 
the effects of racial discrimination, but not race itself.148  ’’The differing and more modest 
treatment of race in the Brown decision may be explained by Warren’s need to gain the approval 
of the entire Court, as opposed to a dissent in which Waring did not have to compromise with 
other judges.’ 
Outside the South, in the district court decisions leading to Brown, social science made it 
difficult for judges to follow what they considered to be binding legal precedent, yet they 
ultimately did.  Southern majorities summarily dismissed any attempts to question segregation.  
Only Waties Waring, in his last major case and writing in dissent, challenged the ideas of race and 
racial classification that had long been accepted by the judicial system and, as seen in the majority 
opinion in his case, local society.  The influence of ideas about race affected the willingness of 
district court judges, to varying degrees, to challenge legal precedent in the area of school 
segregation, and ultimately set the legal and factual record for the Brown decision, a decision that 
forever changed judicial and societal thinking about the practice of racial discrimination. 
 
                                                          
145 WARING, supra note 78, at 365. 
146 In one of their briefs filed with the Supreme Court prior to oral arguments, LDF echoed some of the 
language in Waring’s dissent.  In a short brief summarizing social science evidence that had been presented in the lower 
court cases and invoking the Kansas court’s findings of fact about the harms of segregation, lawyers argued that “racial 
distinction which has been held arbitrary in so many other areas of governmental activity is no more appropriate and can 
be no more reasonable in public education.” Brief for Appellant at 8, Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954), 1952 WL 82046. 
147 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
148 See id. at 494 n.11. 
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